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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model with nancial frictions. We nd that whether stronger patent protection
stimulates or sties innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs.
When credit constraints are non-binding (binding), strengthening patent protection stimu-
lates (sties) R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an inverted-U
pattern. An excessively high level of patent protection prevents a country from converging
to the world technology frontier. A higher level of nancial development inuences credit
constraints through two channels: decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the de-
fault cost. Via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent protection is more likely to
have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development.
We test these results using cross-country regressions and nd supportive evidence for the
interest-spread channel.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model. A novelty of our growth-theoretic analysis of patent policy is that we introduce
nancial frictions in the form of potentially binding credit constraints on R&D entrepreneurs.
When credit constraints are non-binding, we nd that strengthening patent protection by increas-
ing patent breadth leads to a larger amount of monopolistic prot, which stimulates R&D and
technological progress. This positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect captures the traditional view of
patent protection. However, when credit constraints are binding, we nd that the monopolistic
distortion arising from patent protection leads to more severe nancial frictions, which stie R&D
and slow down technological progress. The intuition of this negative nancial distortionary e¤ect
of patent protection can be explained as follows. Strengthening patent protection causes more
severe monopolistic distortion, which in turn reduces aggregate income and tightens credit con-
straints faced by R&D entrepreneurs. As a result, the rates of innovation and economic growth
decrease. This nding is consistent with recent studies that often nd negative e¤ects of patent
protection on innovation.1 Furthermore, we nd that the positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect of
patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is below a threshold value, whereas
the negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent
protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on R&D and
innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that is commonly found in empirical studies.2 An ex-
cessively high level of patent protection even prevents a country from converging to the world
technology frontier. In this case, the countrys technology level relative to the world technology
frontier converges to zero in the long run.
We consider the case in which a higher level of nancial development inuences credit con-
straints through two channels: decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the default cost.
We nd that via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent protection is more likely to
have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. The
intuition of these results can be explained as follows. When the interest-rate spread decreases, the
present value of future prots and the value of inventions increase. Consequently, entrepreneurs
are incentivized to borrow more funding for R&D, rendering the credit constraints more likely
to be binding in which case patent protection has a negative e¤ect on innovation. When the
default cost increases, banks become more willing to lend to R&D entrepreneurs, rendering the
credit constraints less likely to be binding in which case patent protection has a positive e¤ect on
innovation.
We test the above theoretical implications using cross-country regressions. We nd that patent
protection and nancial development have direct positive e¤ects on economic growth. This nding
is consistent with Ang (2010, 2011) who also empirically explore the e¤ects of both patent protec-
tion and nancial development on R&D activity. We complement the analysis in Ang (2010, 2011)
by considering the interactive e¤ect of patent protection and nancial development on economic
growth. In summary, we nd supportive evidence for the interest-spread channel through which
patent protection is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of
nancial development. Therefore, to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on economic
1See for example Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
2See for example Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009).
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growth, it is important to take into consideration the interaction between patent protection and
nancial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive e¤ect
on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus (1969) focuses
on a static partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) model
in which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with nancial frictions to
a¤ect credit constraints and stie innovation. Subsequent studies in this literature, such as Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), explore patent breadth in addition to patent length.
Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature. Our study
instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in a DGE model in which the nancial distortionary
e¤ect of patent policy arises through a general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this study relates
more closely to the macroeconomic literature on patent policy and economic growth based on
DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985), who nds that an innite patent
length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all industries
charge the same markup. Our model features an innite patent length under which the relative-
price distortion is absent as in Judd (1985). However, we show that patent breadth interacts with a
nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent studies in this literature
explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument; see for example, Li (2001),
Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).3 Some of these studies also nd that
strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation and growth. Our study
di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-
to-frontier R&D-based growth model that enables us to explore the technology convergence of
countries. Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014) also analyze the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-
to-frontier model and show that the innovation-maximizing level of patent protection depends
on the income level of a country. However, the abovementioned studies neither feature nancial
frictions nor consider the interaction between patent protection and credit constraints, which is
the novel contribution of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the theoretical results. Section 4 discusses the regression results. The nal section concludes.
2 An R&D-based growth model with credit frictions
In this section, we develop a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model with nancial frictions
based on Aghion et al. (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2006). We consider a discrete-time model and
use the model to explore the interactive e¤ects of patent protection and credit constraints on the
technology convergence of countries.
3For other patent-policy instruments, see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Kiedaisch (2015) on
patentability requirement, Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on protection against imitation,
Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012) on rent protection activities, and Chu (2009),
Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) on blocking patents.
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2.1 Households and workers/entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of countries, indexed by a superscript i, that are behind the world technology
frontier.4 For simplicity, we follow previous studies to assume that countries do not exchange goods
or factors but are subject to international technology spillovers from the frontier. There is a unit
continuum of innitely-lived households in each country. These households own intangible capital
(in the form of patents that generate monopolistic prots) and consume nal goods (numeraire).
The lifetime utility function of the representative household in country i is given by
U i =
1P
t=0
Cit
(1 + )t
,
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Cit is consumption of the represen-
tative household in country i at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is Ait+1 = (1+r
i
t)A
i
t Cit .
From standard dynamic optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the
real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, such that rit = .
In addition to the innitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies to
assume the presence of an overlapping generation of workers/entrepreneurs in each period to
create a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of each period
t, L workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wage W it . At the end of the period,
each worker becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income iW it to R&D, where
i 2 (0; 1).5 At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs who have succeeded in their
R&D projects sell their inventions to households and use the proceeds for consumption. Without
loss of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker who enters the economy in period t has the
utility function uit = y
i
t +Et[o
i
t+1]=(1 + ), where y
i
t denotes consumption when young and Et[o
i
t+1]
denotes expected consumption when old. If the amount of her R&D spending Zit is less than 
iW it ,
then a worker/entrepreneur simply consumes W it   Zit in period t or saves part of it subject to
the market interest rate rit. However, if Z
i
t > 
iW it , then the worker/entrepreneur would need to
apply for a loan subject to credit constraints, which will be described in details in Section 2.7.
2.2 Final goods
The nal goods sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and a con-
tinuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ] to produce nal goods using the following
production function:
Y it = (L
i
t)
1 
Z N it
0
[xit (v)]
dv, (1)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    in production. Lit is labor
input. xit (v) is the amount of intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ], and N it is the number of available
intermediate goods in country i at time t. Competitive rms take the prices of nal goods and
factor inputs as given to maximize prot. The conditional labor demand function is given by
4In this study, we do not model the behavior of the technology frontier and simply take it as given.
5Here we assume that the entrepreneur may not be able to devote her entire wage income to R&D. Our results
also hold when i = 1.
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W it = (1   )Y it =Lit, where Lit = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional
demand function for intermediate goods is given by
xit (v) =


pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (2)
where pit (v) is the price of intermediate goods v in country i.
2.3 Intermediate goods
The intermediate goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. In each industry v,
a monopolistic rm produces xit (v) units of intermediate goods using x
i
t (v) units of nal goods as
inputs. Therefore, the prot function of the monopolistic rm in industry v is
it (v) = p
i
t (v)x
i
t (v)  xit (v) =

pit (v)  1
  
pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (3)
where the second equality follows from (2). Using (3), one can derive the prot-maximizing price
pit (v) given by 1=. To capture the e¤ects of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002)
to model patent breadth i 2 (1; 1=) as a policy variable.6 In this case,
pit (v) = 
i. (4)
Combining (3) and (4), we obtain the amount of prot as a function of patent breadth given by
it (v) =
 
i   1 
i
1=(1 )
 (i), (5)
which is increasing in i for i  1=.
2.4 Aggregate production function
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) yields
Y it =


i
=(1 )
N it . (6)
Equation (6) shows that the growth rate of Y it is determined by the growth rate of N
i
t and that the
level of Y it is decreasing in patent breadth 
i, which captures the e¤ect of monopolistic distortion
on the level of output. In the presence of credit constraints, patent protection would then generate
a negative e¤ect on R&D as a result of this monopolistic distortion as we will show later.
6The idea is that the unit cost for imitative rms to produce an identical product is i, which is increasing in
the level of patent protection. Therefore, stronger patent protection allows the monopolistic producer to charge a
higher markup; see also Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation. This formulation
captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price.
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2.5 R&D and the value of patents
In each country, there is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote nal
goods to R&D at the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in
the next period. To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her R&D
spending Zit over N
i
t R&D projects.
7 Therefore, the amount of nal goods that an entrepreneur
devotes to each of her R&D projects is Zit=N
i
t , and the probability of her R&D projects being
successful is P it = minfZit=(N itit); 1g,8 where 1=it captures the productivity of R&D in country i.
We follow Acemoglu (2009, chapter 18) to assume that it is an increasing function in N
i
t=Nt,
where Nt is the level of technology at the world technology frontier. Nt grows at a constant rate
g > 0, which is taken as given by other countries. Lets dene country is relative technology level
to the frontier as it  N it=Nt 2 (0; 1), which is an inverse measure of the countrys distance to the
world technology frontier. We adopt the following specication for it:
it = [(
i
t)
 + ]

Zit
N it

, (7)
where the parameters f; g > 0 and f; g 2 (0; 1) are common across countries. This speci-
cation features the catching-up e¤ect under which a less developed country that has a smaller
it is able to grow faster by absorbing more world technologies. The term (Z
i
t=N
i
t )
 captures an
intratemporal duplication externality of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000). Given the unit
continuum of R&D entrepreneurs and the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs),
the law of large numbers applies, so that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level
follows a deterministic process given by
N it  N it+1  N it =
Zit
it
=
N it
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
, (8)
where Zit=
i
t = N
i
tZ
i
t=(N
i
t
i
t) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability P it to give rise to a new variety of intermediate goods.
When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the intermediate
goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in period t as V it (v).
Here we assume that the discount rate for future prots is given by ri + i = + i, where i  0
denotes an exogenous interest-rate spread capturing nancial frictions in country i. Under this
assumption, V it (v) can be expressed as
V it (v) =
1P
s=t
is+1 (v)
(1 + ri + i)s+1 t
=

 
i

+ i
, (9)
which is increasing in patent breadth i capturing the positive e¤ect of patent protection on the
value of inventions. In a country that is more nancially developed, there are less nancial frictions,
which in turn reduce the interest-rate spread i and increase the value of inventions. Finally, we
make the following parameter restriction, which guarantees that P it 2 (0; 1) and it 2 (0; 1).
7To ensure the innovation probability P it  1 in the presence of growth in Zit , we only need to assume that
entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Zit over &N
i
t R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of generality, we
set & = 1.
8For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneurs R&D projects either all succeed or all fail.
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Assumption 1 (g)1=(1 ) < 
 
i

=(+ i) < minf1=(1 ); [g( + )]1=(1 )g.9
2.6 Equilibrium without credit constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints. The
zero-expected-prot condition of R&D is given by P itV
i
t = Z
i
t=N
i
t , which can be expressed as
V it = 
i
t ,
(i)
+ i
= [(it)
 + ]

Zit
N it

. (10)
Therefore, the level of R&D in any period t is given by
Zit =

(i)=(+ i)
(it)
 + 
1=
N it , (11)
which is increasing in i for a given level of relative technology it. The growth rate of technology
is given by
git 
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
=
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=
, (12)
which is also increasing in patent breadth i, for a given it, capturing the positive monopolistic
prot e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore, a higher level of nancial develop-
ment in the form of a decrease in the interest-rate spread i increases the growth rate of technology.
We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a higher
growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a decrease in the
interest-rate spread also leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
In the long run, it converges to a steady state, in which N
i
t grows at the same rate as Nt.
10
Setting git to the world technology growth rate g in (12) yields the steady-state level of relative
technology it given by
i =
1
1=
(
1
g

(i)
+ i
(1 )
  
)1=
 1(i
+
; i
 
), (13)
9The assumption 
 
i

=( + i) < 1=(1 ) ensures P it < 1 for 
i
t 2 (0; 1). Derivations are available upon
request.
10We show the stability of this steady state in Section 2.8.
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which is increasing in the level of patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i.
Note that Assumption 1 ensures 1 2 (0; 1) in the steady-state equilibrium. The balanced-growth
level of R&D is given by
Zit = (
i)
g
+ i
N it , (14)
which is increasing in patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other
words, a decrease in the interest-rate spread i causes the entrepreneurs to want to do more R&D.
2.7 Equilibrium with credit constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income iW it to N
i
t R&D projects
without borrowing. If the R&D spending Zit exceeds her wage income 
iW it , then she would have
to borrow Dit = Z
i
t iW it from a bank to nance her R&D projects. If her R&D projects succeed,
she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1 + Rit+1)D
i
t at the end of the period. If
her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to the bank. Therefore, if the
entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects, the expected payment received
by the bank is P it (1 + R
i
t+1)D
i
t + (1   P it )0. When banks make zero expected prot, we have
P it (1 +R
i
t+1)D
i
t = D
i
t.
What makes it di¢ cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when her
projects are successful. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to assume that banks do not observe
the outcome of R&D projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises. Specically, by
paying a default cost hiZit where h
i 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the outcome of her projects
and avoid repaying the loan. The cost parameter hi is an indicator of banks e¤ectiveness in
securing repayment and partly measures the level of nancial development in the country. In case
an entrepreneur decides to default, the entrepreneur must incur the default cost before observing
the outcome of her R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not default if and only if the
following incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
hiZit  P it (1 +Rit+1)Dit = Dit, (15)
where Dit = Z
i
t   iW it = Zit   i(1  )Y it . Substituting this condition into (15) yields
Zit 
i(1  )Y it
1  hi =
i(1  )
1  hi


i
=(1 )
N it , (16)
where the last equality uses (6). We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which
becomes tighter as patent breadth i increases capturing an interaction between the monopolistic
distortion of patent protection on income Y it and the nancial distortion of the credit constraint.
For convenience, we dene f i  i(1   )=(1   hi) 2 (0;1) as a composite parameter that is
increasing in the default cost hi.
Equations (14) and (16) show that the balanced-growth level of R&D spending Zit satises
Zit = min
(

 
i
 g
+ i
; f i


i
=(1 ))
N it . (17)
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There exists a unique value of patent breadth i below (above) which the credit constraint does
not bind (is binding) in the long run. This threshold value of i is given by11
1(f
i
+
; i
+
)  g
g   (+ i)f i , (18)
which is increasing in the countrys default cost f i and the interest-rate spread i. The intuition of
these two results can be explained as follows. First, a larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneurs
incentives to default and enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit
constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value of patent breadth.
Second, a lower interest-rate spread i increases entrepreneursincentives to invest in R&D. As
a result, the credit constraint becomes more likely to be binding, which in turn decreases the
threshold value of patent breadth. In this case, a higher level of nancial development has di¤erent
implications on the threshold value of patent breadth depending on whether nancial development
is reected by an increase in the default cost or a decrease in the interest-rate spread.
Finally, whenever the credit constraint is binding, the growth rate of technology in country i
is given by
git =
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
, (19)
which is decreasing in the level of patent breadth i, for a given it, capturing the nancial
distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore, a higher level of nancial
development in the form of an increase in the default cost f i increases the growth rate of technology.
We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a
lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of an increase
in the default cost leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
2.8 Transition dynamics
Using the denition of relative technology level it, we can derive its law of motion given by
it+1
it
=
N it+1
N it
=
Nt+1
Nt
, it+1 =

1 + git
1 + g

it. (20)
In the absence of credit constraints, we use (12) to express the law of motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
(
1 +
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=)
 H i1(it). (21)
11To ensure that the threshold value 1 < 1=, we assume f
i < (1   )g=( + i), which is equivalent to
hi < 1  (+ i)=(g).
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Even if the credit constraint does not bind in the long run, it may be binding in the short run
when it is small. When the credit constraint is binding, we can use (19) to express the law of
motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
8<:1 + 1(it) + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  H i2(it). (22)
Combining (21) and (22) implies that country is technology level relative to the frontier evolves
according to the following law of motion:
it+1 = minfH i1(it); H i2(it)g,
from which we derive a threshold value ^i of relative technology level below (above) whichH i2 < H
i
1
(H i1 < H
i
2). In other words, when relative technology level 
i
t is below this threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves
according to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when relative technology
level it is above the threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves according to H
i
1(
i
t) that is free from the credit
constraint. The threshold value ^i is given by
^i(i
+
; f i
 
; i
 
) 
(
1

"
(i)
(f i) (+ i)

i

=(1 )
  
#)1=
, (23)
which is increasing in patent breadth i but decreasing in the default cost f i and in the interest-
rate spread i. Intuitively, at a higher level of patent protection, the credit constraint is more
likely to be binding, which in turn expands the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according
to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when either the default cost or the
interest-rate premium increases, the credit constraint becomes less likely to be binding, which in
turn shrinks the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according to H
i
2(
i
t).
In the following lemmata, we derive some properties of the functions fH i1 (it) ; H i2 (it)g, which
will be useful in determining the value of it at the steady state.
Lemma 1 H i1 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i1 (0) = 0, H
i
1 (1) < 1,
@H i1
@it
jit=0 > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 H i2 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i2 (0) = 0,
@H i2
@it
jit=0 =
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=; .
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Proof. See Appendix A.
In addition to the rst threshold value 1 of patent breadth dened in (18), we also dene a
second threshold value 2 of patent breadth below (above) which
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 > 1 (
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 < 1).
2(f
i
+
)  
"
f i 
g
1=(1 )
#(1 )=
, (24)
which is increasing in the default cost f i. We now consider three possibilities.
Case 1 When i  1(f i; i), we have ^i  1(i; i).
In this case, although the credit constraint may be binding in the short run depending on the
initial value of i0, the credit constraint does not bind in the long run. Therefore, the steady-state
value of relative technology it is given by 
i = 1(
i; i), which is increasing in patent breadth
i as shown in (13). The long-run growth rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 1 shows
that the steady state is stable.
1tm +
0 mˆ ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 1: Transition dynamics under i  1
11
Case 2 When 1(f i; i) < 
i < 2(f
i),12 we have ^i > 1(
i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0 > 1.
In this case, the credit constraint is binding even in the long run. The steady-state value of
relative technology level it is determined by the xed point 
i = H i2 (
i), which yields
i =
8<:1
241
g
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
  
359=;
1=
 2(i  ; f
i
+
), (25)
which is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i. The long-run growth
rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 2 shows that the steady state is stable.
1tm +
0 ( )1m b( )2m b mˆ tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 2: Transition dynamics under 1 < 
i < 2
Case 3 When i  2(f i), we have ^i > 1(i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0  1.
In this case, it converges to 0 as shown in Figure 3, and
lim
t!1
it+1
it
= lim
it!0
H i2 (
i
t)
it
=
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  i(i  ; f i+ )  1. (26)
Therefore, the balanced growth rate in country i in this case is
gi = lim
t!1

(1 + g)
it+1
it
  1

= (1 + g) i   1  g, (27)
where i is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
12To ensure 1 < 2, we assume  < f
i[g   (+ i)f i](1 )=(1 )=g(1 )=(1 ).
12
1tm +
0 ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )1 tH m
( )2 tH m
Figure 3: Transition dynamics under i  2
3 Patent breadth and credit constraints
Based on the results in the previous section, we can divide countries into three groups. Without
loss of generality, we rearrange the order of the countries and denote the three groups as group 1,
2 and 3. For countries in group 1, their R&D activities are not restricted by the credit constraint,
and their technologies grow at the same rate as the world technology frontier in the long run.
The levels of patent protection in these countries satisfy i  1(f i; i), which is increasing in the
default cost f i and the interest-rate spread i. For countries in group 2, their R&D activities are
restricted by the credit constraint, but these countries can still keep pace with the growth rate of
the world technology frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these countries
satisfy 1(f
i; i) < i < 2(f
i), where 2(f
i) is increasing in the default cost f i but independent
of the interest-rate spread i. For countries in group 3, their R&D activities are strongly restricted
by the credit constraint. In this case, the technology growth rate in these countries is slower than
that of the world technology frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these
countries satisfy i  2(f i). According to this classication, the relative technology level i of a
country in the steady state is given by
i =
8>>><>>>:
1(
i
+
; i
 
); if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
2(
i
 
; f i
+
); if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
0; if i  2(f i
+
)
, (28)
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and the balanced growth rate of technology is given by
gi =
8>>><>>>:
g; if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
g; if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
(1 + g) i(i
 
; f i
+
)  1  g; if i  2(f i
+
)
. (29)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There are three types of balanced growth paths in the world. First, when i 
1(f
i; i), relative technology level i converges to 1, and the growth rate of technology converges
to g. In this case, 1 is increasing in patent breadth 
i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread
i. Second, when 1(f
i; i) < i < 2(f
i), relative technology level i converges to 2, and the
growth rate of technology converges to g. In this case, 2 is decreasing in patent breadth 
i and
increasing in the default cost f i. Third, when i  2(f i), relative technology level i converges
to zero, and the growth rate of technology converges to (1 + g) i  1, which is decreasing in patent
breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
Proof. Proven in text.
Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates the three groups of countries. Countries in group 1 are not nancially
constrained due to a high default cost f i. In this case, stronger patent protection increases the
amount of monopolistic prot, which in turn stimulates R&D and increases the relative technology
level 1 in the long run. Countries in group 2 are nancially constrained due to a moderate default
cost f i. In this case, stronger patent protection amplies monopolistic distortion and reduces the
level of output, which in turn tightens the credit constraint on R&D and decreases the relative
technology level 2 in the long run. For a given value of the default cost f
i, an increase in the level
of patent protection may cause a country in group 1 to fall into group 2. Therefore, there exists
a technology-maximizing level of patent protection 1 that is increasing in the default cost f
i.
As mentioned before, a larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneursincentives to default, which
14
enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely
to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value 1 of patent breadth. Furthermore,
the technology-maximizing level of patent protection 1 is increasing in the interest-rate spread
i. Intuitively, a higher interest rate decreases the value of inventions and reduces entrepreneurs
incentives to invest in R&D. As a result, the credit constraint becomes less likely to bind, rendering
patent protection to be more likely to have a positive e¤ect on R&D. A higher level of nancial
development increases the cost of default but decreases the interest-rate spread in a country.
Therefore, under a higher level of nancial development, it is not clear whether patent protection
would become more likely to have a positive or negative e¤ect on innovation. This depends on
whether nancial development increases the default cost or decreases the interest-rate spread. We
summarize these results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation. If nancial development
increases the default cost, then patent protection would be more likely to have a positive e¤ect
on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. If nancial development decreases
the interest-rate spread, then patent protection would be more likely to have a negative e¤ect on
innovation under a higher level of nancial development.
Proof. Proven in text.
Finally, countries in group 3 have a very low default cost f i. Given that R&D entrepreneurs
have strong incentives to default in this case, they are not able to borrow much funding for R&D.
In this case, the steady-state growth rate is given by (1 + g) i   1  g, where i is decreasing in
the level of patent breadth. An increase in the default cost helps to mitigate this problem and
raises the steady-state growth rate.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we examine the empirical evidence of our theoretical predictions. The implications
of our theory that will be tested are the followings:
1. The likelihood that a country converges to the frontier growth rate increases with its level
of nancial development, but decreases with its level of patent protection.
2. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, nancial development has a positive
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
3. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, patent protection has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
4. If nancial development decreases the interest-rate spread (increases the default cost), then
patent protection would be more likely to have a negative (positive) e¤ect on the steady-state
level of relative per-capita GDP under a higher level of nancial development.
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4.1 Data
The dataset consists of 105 countries from 1980 to 2009 featuring variables of economic growth,
patent protection, nancial development and other controls.13 We transform the dataset into a
cross section by taking annual average of each variable for each country. The growth rate of a
country is taken to be the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1980 and 2009.
For the measure of patent protection within a country, we consider the commonly used index of
patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008).14 The data for nancial
development is based on the Financial Development and Structure Dataset from Cihak et al.
(2012).
Following King and Levine (1993) and Beck et al. (2010), we take advantage of three indicators
of nancial intermediation that can proxy the overall development of a countrys nancial system.
The rst measure is the private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as
a share of GDP, denoted as private credit. The second indicator is deposit money banksassets
as a share of GDP, denoted as bank assets. The third indicator is liquid liabilities as a share of
GDP, denoted as liquid liabilities. We use private credit as our preferred measure of nancial
development as in Ang (2010, 2011) and consider the other two measures as robustness checks
because as stated in Levine et al. (2000), private credit excludes credit granted to the public sector
and credit granted by the central bank and development banks.
In our theoretical model, the amount of borrowing as a share of output is given by
Dit
Y it
=
Zit   iW it
Y it
= min
(

 
i
 g
+ i

i

=(1 )
; f i
)
  i(1  ),
where the second equality follows from (17) and (6). Therefore, Dit=Y
i
t is increasing in the default
cost f i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other words, an increase in Dit=Y
i
t in the
data may reect the e¤ect of a larger f i or the e¤ect of a smaller i.
4.2 Convergence regression
We rst use the convergence regression model based on Aghion et al. (2005) to test our theoretical
implications. The starting point of this model is that each country is assumed to be on a transition
path towards its steady state. From (20)-(22), patent protection and nancial development a¤ect
the relative growth rate of a country that is converging to the frontier given by (1 + git)=(1 +
g) = it+1=
i
t. In particular, (21) and (22) show that the initial relative technology level has a
negative e¤ect on the transitional relative growth rate and that nancial development always has
a positive e¤ect regardless of whether it increases the default cost f i or decreases the interest-rate
spread i. In countries without binding credit constraints, patent protection positively a¤ects
the transitional relative growth rate, whereas in countries with binding credit constraints, patent
protection negatively a¤ects the transitional relative growth rate. This empirical analysis is an
13See Appendix B for description and sources of data.
14The index covers ve dimensions: 1) extent of coverage; 2) membership in international patent agreements;
3) provisions for loss of protection; 4) enforcement mechanisms; and 5) duration of protection. Each dimension is
assigned a value between zero and one. The overall index is the unweighted sum of these ve values, with a larger
value reecting a higher level of patent protection.
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extension of Aghion et al. (2005) with the addition of patent protection, so we follow them to
approximate our theoretical model by the following cross-sectional regression, which can be used
to investigate the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on the steady-state level
of per-capita GDP growth relative to the frontier:
gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i, (30)
where gi denotes the average annual growth rate of per-capita GDP, i denotes the average level
of patent protection, Fi denotes the average level of nancial development, yi is the log of initial
per-capita GDP, xi is a set of other control variables and "i is the disturbance term with mean
zero. The subscript i denotes country, and country 1 is the technology leader, which we take to
be the United States.
Dene country is initial relative per-capita GDP as y^i  yi   y1. Then we can rewrite (30) as
gi   g1 = i  (y^i   y^i ) ,
where the steady-state value y^i is given by setting the right-hand side of (30) to zero (i.e., when
the growth rate di¤erence is zero):
y^i =
0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + xxi + "i
 (y + y  i + Fy  Fi)
. (31)
In (30), i is a country-specic convergence parameter given by
i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi. (32)
It is useful to note that a country converges to the technology frontier if and only if the growth
rate of its relative per-capita GDP depends negatively on the initial y^i; that is, if and only if
i < 0. Thus, from implication 1 we know that the likelihood of convergence would increase with
nancial development and decrease with patent protection if and only if
Fy < 0 and y > 0. (33)
From (31), the long-run e¤ects of nancial development and patent protection on the relative
output of a country that converges are as follows:
@y^i
@Fi
=   1
i|{z}
+
(F + Fi + Fyy^

i )| {z }
?
, (34)
and
@y^i
@i
=   1
i|{z}
+
( + FFi + yy^

i )| {z }
?
. (35)
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4.3 Relative-technology-level regression
In addition to the convergence regression, we also consider the following relative-technology-level
regression:
yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i, (36)
where yi is the average log of per-capita GDP, i is another disturbance term with mean zero, and
the other variables are dened in the same way as in the convergence regression. This regression
model also captures the implications from (21) and (22) that patent protection and nancial
development a¤ect a countrys relative technology level with respect to the technology frontier.
It is useful to note that our data sample covers 30 years, so we can approximate the steady-state
level of relative per-capita GDP by yi   y1, and hence, this regression model can be used as an
additional test of implications 2-4.
4.4 Regression results
Considering the endogeneity of nancial development as discussed in Aghion et al. (2005) and
also the potential endogeneity of patent protection, we estimate the regression models using in-
strumental variables. We consider two cases. First, we assume that only nancial development
is endogenous. In this case, we instrument for Fi, i  Fi and Fi  (yi   y1) using legal origins,
legal origins interacted with patent protection, and legal origins interacted with initial relative
output, respectively. Second, we assume that both nancial development and patent protection
are endogenous. In this case, we use legal origins as the instrument for Fi, and lagged patent
protection (averaged over 1960-1979) and initial relative output (yi   y1) as the instruments for
i.
15 The interacted terms between instruments are also used as instruments for the interacted
terms of the endogenous variables. Tables I and III are for the rst case, and Tables II and IV are
for the second case.
[Insert Tables I and II here]
From Tables I and II, we nd that the following results are robust and signicant: (1) y > 0,
Fy < 0, y < 0; and (2)  > 0, F > 0, F < 0. The rst set of results fy > 0, Fy < 0,
y < 0g supports implication 1. It is useful to recall that a country converges to the technology
frontier if and only if i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi < 0. Therefore, Fy < 0 and y > 0 imply
that the likelihood of convergence increases with nancial development but decreases with patent
protection.
To understand the implications of the second set of results f > 0, F > 0, F < 0g, lets
being by assuming that all countries lag behind the United States in the steady state; i.e., y^i < 0.
Financial development would have a positive long-run e¤ect on the relative income of each country
that converges if and only if F + Fi + Fyy^

i > 0. In this term, Fi is negative because the
estimated F is negative, whereas Fyy^

i is positive because the estimated Fy is negative. The
15Our results for private credit and bank assets are largely the same if we use only lagged patent protection as
the instrument for i.
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result F > 0 implies that nancial development is likely to have a positive long-run e¤ect, and
this positive e¤ect is unlikely to vanish or become negative because F + Fyy^

i > 0. This nding
is consistent with implication 2. We also consider the magnitude of the coe¢ cients. The tests of
endogeneity of instrumented variables show that the measure of patent protection is likely to be
exogenous, according to Table I (See the p-values for C-test). Hence, we use the coe¢ cients in
Table I here, but the coe¢ cients in Table II are reasonably similar. From regression 2 of Table I,
we have F + Fi = 0:0435   0:0127  i. Given a mean of 2.60 for i, F + Fi is positive
for the average country. Together with Fyy^

i > 0, nancial development has a positive long-run
e¤ect on the relative income of the average country. Moreover, we use equation (34) to compute
the long-run e¤ect of nancial development and nd that nancial development has a positive
long-run e¤ect in the vast majority of countries.
As for patent protection, it would have a positive long-run e¤ect on each country that converges
if and only if  + FFi + yy^

i > 0. In this term, FFi is negative because the estimated F
is negative, and yy^

i is also negative because the estimated y is positive. The result  > 0
implies that patent protection may have a positive long-run e¤ect, but this positive e¤ect may
turn negative because FFi+yy^

i < 0. From Table I, we have  +FFi = 0:0137 0:0127 Fi.
Given a mean of 0.456 for Fi, the average country has  + FFi > 0. However, given that
yy^

i < 0 and that Fi can be as large as 1.776, patent protection would have a negative long-run
e¤ect in countries with su¢ ciently large Fi. In other words, patent protection has a negative
(positive) long-run e¤ect when the level of nancial development Fi is high (low). Using equation
(35) to compute the long-run e¤ect of patent protection, we nd that patent protection has a
positive (negative) long-run e¤ect in about one-third (two-thirds) of countries, and these countries
have a low (high) level of nancial development. This nding is consistent with implications 3
and 4 as well as the scenario in which the interest-spread channel dominates in inuencing credit
constraints. In other words, when the level of nancial development is low (i.e., a high interest-rate
spread in the model), patent protection has a positive long-run e¤ect. When the level of nancial
development is high (i.e., a low interest-rate spread in the model), the e¤ect of patent protection
becomes negative.
[Insert Tables III and IV here]
From Tables III and IV, we nd that  > 0, F > 0, F < 0 and y > 0. The implications of
this set of results are similar to the above, so we do not repeat the discussion and simply report
the results as a robustness check. Finally, we also estimate the likelihood of convergence for each
country. We use the coe¢ cients in regression 2 of Table I to compute the estimated value of
convergence parameter i, and its standard deviation. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to classify a
country as most likely to converge in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations
below zero, as most likely to diverge in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations
above zero, and as uncertain to converge otherwise. As reported in Table V, we nd that none of
the countries in our sample is classied as most likely to diverge, and there are 69 countries (out
of 105) that are classied as most likely to converge.
[Insert Table V here]
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on
economic growth. The novelty of our analysis is that we consider the presence of credit constraints
on R&D entrepreneurs. We nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive or
negative e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit constraints
are not binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. When
credit constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative e¤ect on growth. An
increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit constraints to become binding. As
a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U pattern.
A higher level of nancial development inuences credit constraints via two channels: decreasing
the interest-rate spread and increasing the default cost. Our regression analysis nds supportive
evidence for the interest-spread channel under which strengthening patent protection is more likely
to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. These results
show the importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic distortion caused
by patent protection and the nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (21), we see that H i1 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
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Evaluating (A1) at it = 0 yields
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which is satised due to the assumption (i)= (+ i) > (g)1=(1 ) that ensures 1(
i) > 0.
Evaluating H i1 (
i
t) at 
i
t = 1 yields
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1
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which is satised due to the assumption 
 
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Proof of Lemma 2. From (22), we see that H i2 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
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Appendix B: Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 105 countries over 1980-2009. Variables
used for regression are listed below with denitions and data sources. The variables of annual
change rate (i.e., economic growth rate and ination rate) are calculated through log di¤erences.
In the cross-section regressions, the annual variables are all averaged over the sample period.
 gi: the averaged annual growth rate of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 yi: the log of real per capita GDP at the initial period (1980). Source: Penn World Table
7.1.
 yi: the average log of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 i: the average degree of patent protection over 1980-2009, measured by the average index
of patent rights. Source: Park (2008).
 oldi : the average degree of patent protection over 1960-1979, measured by the average index
of patent rights. Source: Park (2008).
 Fi: the average level of nancial development. There are three measures: 1) the average
value of private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of
GDP (private credit); 2) the average value of deposit money banksassets as a share of GDP
(bank assets); 3) the average value of liquid liabilities as a share of GDP (liquid liabilities).
Source: Cihak et al. (2012).
 seci: the average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 in the initial period
(1980). Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
 inf i: the average ination rate over 1980-2009, dened as log di¤erence of GDP deator.
Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 gov i: the average government expenditure as a share of GDP over 1980-2009. Source: Penn
World Table 7.1.
 openi: the average openness to trade over 1980-2009, dened as sum of real exports and
imports as a share of GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 legal i: Dummy variables for British, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist legal ori-
gins. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
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Summary statistics
Variable # of obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
i 105 2.600 0.900 0.5 4.721
Fi (private credit) 105 0.456 0.396 0.013 1.776
Fi (bank assets) 105 0.511 0.406 0.016 1.981
Fi (liquid liabilities) 105 0.526 0.423 0.063 2.721
gi 105 0.014 0.017 -0.037 0.084
yi 105 8.320 1.250 6.006 10.371
yi 105 8.471 1.343 5.816 10.804
oldi 100 1.627 0.745 0 3.825
seci 105 1.422 1.076 0.06 5.19
inf i 105 0.030 0.003 0.017 0.038
gov i 105 0.099 0.052 0.035 0.325
openi 105 0.706 0.464 0.186 2.926
Legal origin classications
 British: Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, Fiji, United Kingdom, Ghana,
Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Sir Lanka, Malawi,
Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Singapore, Sierra
Leone, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, United States, South
Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
 French: Argentina, Burundi, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic,
Cote dIvoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mali, Malta, Mozambique,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, El Salvador, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zaire.
 German: Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Korea.
 Scandinavian: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
 Socialist: Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Vietnam.
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Appendix C: Regression results
Table I: Convergence regression
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
Endogenous variables: Fi, i  Fi, Fi  (yi   y1).
Instrument variables: legal i, legal i  i, legal i  (yi   y1).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0148*** 0.0137*** 0.0186*** 0.0146*** 0.0176*** 0.00732
(3.68) (3.74) (4.86) (3.39) (5.64) (0.61)
F 0.0569*** 0.0435*** 0.0728*** 0.0511*** 0.0827*** -0.00383
(2.87) (2.69) (3.74) (2.67) (3.17) (-0.04)
F -0.0149*** -0.0127*** -0.0194*** -0.0139*** -0.0221*** -0.000773
(-2.87) (-3.06) (-4.09) (-2.88) (-3.43) (-0.03)
y -0.00968** -0.00834* -0.0106** -0.00675 -0.00478 0.000531
(-2.16) (-1.95) (-2.56) (-1.45) (-1.55) (0.08)
y 0.00459*** 0.00444*** 0.00489*** 0.00386** 0.00352** 0.00291
(3.04) (2.74) (3.93) (2.37) (2.57) (1.65)
Fy -0.0235*** -0.0255*** -0.0213*** -0.0229*** -0.0183*** -0.0274**
(-7.47) (-8.49) (-6.71) (-7.75) (-5.47) (-2.62)
p-values
Hansens J -test 0.4137 0.3707 0.5810 0.3919 0.6953 0.3578
C-test 0.0148 0.0567 0.0549 0.4123 0.0703 0.1429
Sample size 105 105 105 105 105 105
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf,
open. Hansens J -test stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, C-test stands for testing
the endogeneity of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by
GMM method. We use the command ivregress in Stata to perform the regressions.
26
Table II: Convergence regression
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
Endogenous variables: i, Fi, i  Fi, i  (yi   y1), Fi  (yi   y1).
Instrument variables: oldi , legal i, legal i  oldi , oldi  (yi   y1), legal i  (yi   y1),
(yi   y1), (yi   y1)2.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0174*** 0.0142*** 0.0200*** 0.0142** 0.0243*** 0.0255**
(3.78) (2.83) (4.39) (2.63) (3.60) (2.08)
F 0.0761*** 0.0566* 0.0820*** 0.0497* 0.121*** 0.148
(3.02) (1.91) (3.61) (1.90) (2.76) (1.50)
F -0.0202*** -0.0163** -0.0214*** -0.0132** -0.0317*** -0.0373
(-3.12) (-2.15) (-3.82) (-2.03) (-2.90) (-1.52)
y -0.0140*** -0.0121** -0.0137*** -0.00945* -0.0130** -0.00921
(-2.70) (-2.48) (-2.73) (-1.86) (-2.03) (-1.25)
y 0.00689*** 0.00676*** 0.00636*** 0.00574** 0.00673** 0.00607**
(3.01) (3.00) (2.80) (2.48) (2.60) (2.34)
Fy -0.0272*** -0.0296*** -0.0242*** -0.0261*** -0.0218*** -0.0207
(-5.27) (-5.80) (-5.29) (-4.97) (-2.92) (-1.64)
p-values
Hansens J -test 0.3845 0.2520 0.5016 0.3368 0.8266 0.7596
C-test for endog 0.2959 0.5524 0.4520 0.7029 0.0864 0.2320
Sample size 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf,
open. Hansens J -test stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, C-test stands for testing
the endogeneity of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by
GMM method. We use the command ivregress in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table III: Relative-technology-level regression
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
Endogenous variables: Fi, i  Fi.
Instrument variables: legal i, legal i  i.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.322*** 0.334*** 0.385*** 0.368*** 0.398*** 0.403***
(7.39) (6.12) (7.81) (5.59) (5.91) (3.99)
F 3.085*** 3.224*** 2.990*** 2.912*** 2.772*** 2.942***
(11.21) (7.15) (11.16) (5.66) (6.59) (3.74)
F -0.711*** -0.778*** -0.703*** -0.696*** -0.660*** -0.727***
(-9.34) (-6.89) (-9.86) (-5.57) (-6.06) (-3.77)
y 0.870*** 0.894*** 0.858*** 0.896*** 0.897*** 0.952***
(38.84) (27.14) (36.99) (27.71) (27.82) (33.80)
p-values
Hansens J -test 0.2612 0.3340 0.1195 0.0982 0.1034 0.1188
C-test for endog 0.5278 0.7230 0.4462 0.4513 0.8821 0.8558
Sample size 105 105 105 105 105 105
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf,
open. Hansens J -test stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, C-test stands for testing
the endogeneity of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by
GMM method. We use the command ivregress in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table IV: Relative-technology-level regression
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
Endogenous variables: i, Fi, i  Fi.
Instrument variables: oldi , legal i, legal i  oldi , (yi   y1), legal i  (yi   y1).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.421*** 0.443*** 0.398*** 0.455*** 0.370*** 0.386***
(4.83) (3.71) (4.02) (3.66) (3.12) (3.70)
F 3.038*** 3.683*** 2.543*** 3.089*** 2.191*** 2.532***
(5.48) (3.20) (4.10) (3.31) (2.86) (2.88)
F -0.749*** -0.924** -0.621*** -0.755*** -0.556*** -0.641***
(-5.23) (-3.32) (-4.05) (-3.31) (-2.86) (-2.96)
y 0.872*** 0.891*** 0.882*** 0.903*** 0.937*** 0.969***
(24.87) (23.36) (19.13) (21.21) (19.82) (43.69)
p-values
Hansens J -test 0.4978 0.6504 0.3730 0.5270 0.4206 0.6043
C-test for endog 0.2158 0.3679 0.2987 0.4275 0.4979 0.6192
Sample size 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf,
open. Hansens J -test stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, C-test stands for testing
the endogeneity of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by
GMM method. We use the command ivregress in Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table V: Convergence club membership
1 2
Countries most likely to converge Countries uncertain to converge
Japan Austria Trinidad and Tobago Italy Iraq*
Cyprus New Zealand Bolivia Mali Tanzania
Hong Kong France Uruguay Belgium Poland
Switzerland Vietnam Dominican Rep. Zimbabwe Ghana
Thailand Papua New Guinea Greece Algeria Haiti
United States Mauritius Paraguay Malawi Bulgaria
Luxembourg Egypt Costa Rica Burundi Uganda
United Kingdom Indonesia Cote dIvoire Zambia El Salvador
Malaysia Norway Kenya Cameroon Hungary
China Korea Colombia Benin Sierra Leone
Singapore Australia Mauritania Niger Romania
Malta Israel Senegal Turkey
Portugal Nicaragua Venezuela Mexico
Iceland Denmark Nepal Syria
Jordan Mozambique Ecuador Gabon
Canada Morocco Swaziland Botswana
Germany Honduras Togo Liberia
South Africa India Peru Jamaica
Guyana Finland Philippines Zaire
Spain Bangladesh Sri Lanka
Netherlands Iran Rwanda
Tunisia Fiji Argentina
Panama Pakistan Central African Rep.
Sweden Guatemala Sudan
Ireland Brazil Congo, Rep.
Note: The estimated convergence parameters are based on the coe¢ cients in regression 2 of Table
I. The estimated convergence parameter increases within each group, as you move down each list and
then to the right. There are three groups of classication: countries most likely to converge, countries
uncertain to converge, and countries most likely to diverge in growth rate. A country is classied to the
rst group if its estimated convergence parameter is at least two standard deviation below zero, to the
third group if its estimated convergence parameter is at least two standard deviation above zero, and to
the second group otherwise. However, there is no country that belongs to the third group according to
our estimates.
* The estimated convergence parameter is negative (indicating convergence) in countries before Iraq
and positive (indicating divergence) in countries after (and including) Iraq.
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